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Nature and importance 
of the issue
Much of ICTD’s research concerns 
domestic taxation, but international 
taxation is also important to developing 
countries – especially taxation of 
transnational corporations (TNCs). In 
many developing countries the formal 
economy is dominated by foreign-owned 
firms, while much domestic economic 
activity occurs informally, with few if any 
books and records maintained. This 
makes it hard for governments to raise 
revenue from individual income taxes or 
consumption taxes. For these countries, 
corporate taxation, and especially taxation 
of the profits of foreign-owned companies, 
represents a substantial portion of the 
potentially available revenue base. 
Low-income countries are generally more 
dependent on corporate income tax. On 
average it accounts for 16 per cent of 
their revenues, compared to 8 per cent for 
high-income countries.1 
There has been increasing concern in the 
past few years about the damaging effects 
of international corporate tax avoidance, for 
several reasons. First is the direct impact 
on government revenues: provisional 
estimates by IMF economists suggest that 
the long-run losses for advanced economies 
are in the order of 0.6 per cent of their GDP, 
but proportionately three times greater in 
developing countries, reaching almost 2 
per cent of GDP.2 Second, corporate tax 
avoidance undermines public confidence in 
the legitimacy of taxation. Third, many of the 
techniques of international tax avoidance 
entail making use of the tax haven and 
‘offshore’ finance and secrecy system. 
These same facilities are also used for a 
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capital flight and concealing the proceeds of 
corruption and crime, which are also especially 
damaging for developing countries.3
For the past half-century, the formulation of 
international tax rules has been dominated by 
the developed countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). The UN Tax Committee (Committee 
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters) has played a secondary role, hampered 
especially by its lack of resources.4
Policy context
Concerns about international corporate tax 
avoidance led the G20 world leaders in 2013 to 
support the project launched by the OECD on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). The 
G20 asked for reform of international tax rules 
to ensure that TNCs could be taxed ‘where 
economic activities occur and value is created’.5 
The BEPS project operated within a very tight 
timescale of thirty months, and under the 
constraint of reaching consensus among a large 
group of states. Although the project involved 
the eight non-OECD countries in the G20, and 
half-way through a further dozen developing 
countries were also included, the process was 
inevitably dominated by developed countries. 
The interests of developing countries in the 
international tax rules are in important respects 
different from, and sometimes contrary to, 
those of the OECD countries. In particular, 
developing countries are mainly importers of 
capital, and hence host countries for TNCs. 
The main framework of international tax rules is 
created by tax treaties, of which there are now 
over 3,000. Because they aim to encourage 
reciprocal international capital flows, treaties 
generally restrict the rights of host governments 
to tax corporate income at source. Capital-
importing countries are therefore systematically 
disadvantaged, to the extent that tax treaties 
have been described as a ‘poisoned chalice’ for 
developing countries.6 The shift to a concern 
to prevent ‘double non-taxation’, and the 
outcomes of the BEPS project, will result in some 
significant changes to the tax treaty system. 
Developing countries should carefully review 
their policies, especially to ensure that treaty 
negotiation is rooted in domestic tax structures 
as well as economic development policies. 
Developing countries generally have few tax 
treaties. However, even a single treaty may 
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a company formed in that treaty partner. Some 
countries aim to offer themselves as conduits 
in this way, by negotiating many treaties, e.g. 
the Netherlands and the UK, and more recently 
offshore centres such as Jersey and Mauritius.7 
The provisions of a treaty with such a country 
should be especially carefully scrutinized.
The ICTD has supported two main programmes 
of research, in parallel with and following on from 
the BEPS project. One aimed to examine the 
longer-term implications for developing countries 
of an alternative approach to taxation of TNCs, 
and the other focused on more immediate policy 
options.
Unitary taxation of TNCs 
with special reference to 
developing countries
A unitary approach entails treating a TNC 
as a single firm for taxation purposes, rather 
than attempting to tax the profits of its various 
affiliates as if they were independent entities. A 
fully-fledged unitary taxation (UT) system with 
formulary apportionment would start with the 
TNC’s aggregate worldwide profits (excluding 
internal transfers), and apportion them by a 
formula based on factors reflecting real economic 
activities within each country (e.g. employees, 
assets and sales). Although unitary taxation with 
formulary apportionment is not on the immediate 
policy agenda, the research aimed to explore 
not only the long-term issues of design of such 
a system, but also short-term implications 
of moving towards a unitary approach. The 
following were its main findings.
Formulary apportionment has long been 
permitted under international tax treaty rules. 
Although the relevant provision was dropped 
from the OECD model convention in 2010, this 
revision has not yet been implemented widely 
among OECD countries and has been rejected 
by developing countries.8 Although not without 
its difficulties, formulary apportionment would 
be the most effective approach to eliminate 
BEPS, since it would apportion income according 
to the selected measures of real economic 
activity. Administrative procedures can be 
devised for such a system which would be much 
easier to administer than current arm’s length 
pricing rules. International agreement on an 
apportionment formula would not be essential, 
as, even with some divergence in formulas, firms 
would have clear and predictable rules on which 
to base investment decisions.9
Different models of formulary apportionment 
have long operated with relative success in 
federal systems with state taxation (Canada, 
Switzerland and the US), and a detailed 
proposal, the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base (CCCTB), has been formulated 
and is under consideration in the EU. Agreed 
apportionment formulas (as in Canada and 
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reduce the scope for states to modify the 
apportionment factors to attract investment. 
Looser coordination (as in the US) has led 
to a shift towards formulas favouring sales 
by destination. This can create problems if a 
company sells in a state where it has no taxable 
presence (nexus), but overall tax losses can be 
staunched by the adoption of throwback rules 
(i.e. assigning taxation rights to the source 
state if profits are untaxed in the destination 
state). Agreement on the CCCTB poses political 
challenges for the EU, where harmonisation of 
direct taxation requires unanimity among the 
member states – although a special procedure 
is available for a smaller group. Most other 
regional groupings of countries do not at 
present envisage direct tax harmonisation, 
with the notable exception of the East African 
Community, where it could be studied as a 
policy option.10
Formulary apportionment eliminates the 
possibility of shifting income across states by 
manipulating where income is booked, and 
greatly reduces competition between states to 
attract investment by offering tax incentives. 
However, it focuses attention on formula factors 
and tax rates. The shift in the US towards a 
stronger weighting of sales has reduced tax 
revenues, especially in states without ‘throwback’ 
rules. However, the location of economic activity 
has not been significantly affected, at least over 
a longer period as more states moved to a higher 
sales weighting. Tax rates have remained stable, 
as a destination-based sales formula reduces 
pressure to offer low rates or other incentives for 
inward investment.11
It is very difficult to estimate the likely effect of 
formulary apportionment on the distribution of 
tax revenues among countries. The standard 
commercially available database (Orbis) contains 
little data on developing countries, and none on 
company sales by destination. Nevertheless, it 
can be said that apportioning profit according 
to measures of actual economic activity would 
result in a significant redistribution of the tax 
base, in most cases towards the lower-income 
countries in the sample. However, this is 
particularly sensitive to the labour factor in 
the formula, especially the choice between 
headcount and payroll measures, as the latter 
would clearly favour high-wage countries. 
Companies would benefit from international loss 
consolidation (allowing them to deduct losses in 
one country from profits in another), which could 
reduce the overall tax base by around 12 per 
cent. However, this would be compensated by 
ending the attribution of disproportionate profits 
to low-tax countries.12
One obstacle to the introduction of formulary 
apportionment lies in current standard 
international accounting practices, as embodied 
in the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). These have not been 
developed for tax purposes. They are not 
a suitable basis for defining a consolidated 
corporate tax base, which is an essential 
underpinning for unitary taxation. However, 
the technical work done on the CCCTB 
shows that agreement on substantially 
harmonised tax accounting standards, based 
on actual transactions and receipts rather 
than expectations of future revenue, could be 
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common tax base excluded elements involving 
policy choices, such as depreciation and 
investment allowances, and perhaps interest.13
The finance sector is a major user of 
tax havens and international avoidance 
techniques, because the attribution of profit 
from international financial services is easily 
manipulated. Formulary apportionment has 
been applied to global trading of financial 
instruments for some twenty years with 
substantial success through multilateral 
Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). The 
finance sector is particularly suitable for 
application of unitary taxation. However, 
this should be done on total consolidated 
corporate profits rather than the profits 
from different activity segments. Profit 
apportionment among taxing jurisdictions 
should be made according to an origin-based 
labour factor and a destination-based 
sales factor.14
We also made a study of experiences of 
the application of the sub-national unitary 
taxation system to companies engaged in the 
extractive sector (mining, oil and gas) in the 
US and Canada. The researchers advise that 
these taxes should not be used in isolation or 
employed as the dominant source of revenues 
from the extractive sector. Instead, a unitary 
corporate income tax may be best used in 
combination with other rent/profit-related 
levies on the extractive sector because of its 
informational and risk-aligning advantages. 
At the same time, the profit apportionment 
factors should give greater weight to the state of 
production, to reflect its claim to tax rents from 
resource extraction, and since consumption 
especially of oil products is generally heavily 
taxed. Within this context, a unitary corporate 
income tax could enable more effective design 
and administration of all taxes in the extractive 
industries sector.15
Revenue Enhancement in 
Developing Economies 
(REDE) 
This involved two groups of projects, one 
examining implementation by developing 
countries of some of the BEPS project outcomes, 
and the other dealing with issues beyond the 
scope of the BEPS project.
One of the key BEPS project proposals 
concerns how to limit deductions of interest, 
which are a major technique for tax 
avoidance and profit shifting internationally. 
Many developing countries still use thin 
capitalisation rules, which base deductibility 
on a permissible ratio of debt to company 
equity. These have been found ineffective 
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recommended a group ratio rule, which would 
apportion the consolidated net interest costs 
of the TNC as a whole to its local affiliates 
based on a ratio such as earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA). However, the final report suggested 
that this should be combined with a fixed cap 
on the amount of interest which is deductible, 
in a range between 10 per cent and 30 per 
cent of EBITDA. A study by Michael Durst 
finds that a group ratio rule would be an 
improvement, but developing countries 
should also consider a more comprehensive 
approach which would also cover other 
deductions.16 
In another study, Durst has amplified this 
suggestion by proposing a modified version 
of the transactional net margin method of 
transfer pricing. This would avoid the need for a 
detailed audit based on functional analysis and 
attempting to identify comparable independent 
firms, by simply establishing a benchmark 
for the local affiliate’s profitability. The local 
affiliate would be required to earn a profit 
margin in proportion to that of the corporate 
group as a whole. The benchmark he suggests 
is 25% of the group’s earnings before tax, 
chosen to arrive at a profit allocation which 
could be acceptable to both the revenue 
authority and the taxpayer, while preventing 
the very low requirements of income that 
under current practice tend to be ascribed to 
‘risk-stripped’ subsidiaries.17 Such a provision 
could be applied as a ‘safe harbour’, although 
to be effective it should not be optional for 
taxpayers.
However, Durst has also recommended that 
developing countries should be selective in 
deciding which BEPS measures to implement, 
in view of both the political obstacles and the 
administrative challenges they involve. It is 
likely to be more cost-effective to apply limited 
resources to improving excise and general 
consumption taxation, income taxation of large- 
and medium-sized domestic businesses, natural 
resource royalties (as opposed to income-based 
taxes on mineral producers), real property 
taxation and payroll taxation.18
A major step forward in the BEPS project is 
the agreement to improve information-based 
standard templates, which for the first time 
would give all tax authorities a comprehensive 
overview of the structure and activities of each 
TNC. One is for country-by-country reports 
(CbCRs), which will provide basic information 
on the activities of the largest TNCs, including 
a listing of affiliates, and a statement of the 
profits, employees, taxes paid and taxes due 
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presence. The others are for a Master File 
and Local File for enhanced transfer pricing 
documentation. However, the scheme for 
CbCRs entails a cumbersome process. TNCs 
have first to file information with their home 
country tax authority. That authority should then 
use agreements for information exchange to 
disseminate the CbCRs to the tax authorities 
in every country where the TNC in question 
declares a taxable presence. A forthcoming 
study by Sol Picciotto will analyse the domestic 
and international provisions that developing 
countries should establish to be able to benefit 
from these arrangements. 
A less successful outcome of the BEPS project 
is the package of revisions of the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines. Although they could 
strengthen the powers of tax authorities, they will 
make transfer pricing guidelines more complex 
and difficult to administer. This is a particular 
problem for developing countries. Two case 
studies have been carried out of the difficulties 
experienced by developing countries in applying 
transfer pricing rules. One is by Veronica 
Grondona on Argentina, and the other by Attiya 
Waris on Kenya. 
Concern has been expressed by TNCs and 
their tax advisers that strengthened transfer 
pricing enforcement based on subjective 
and discretionary rules will lead to increased 
conflicts. Consequently, they have pressed for 
mandatory binding arbitration of international 
tax disputes, especially on transfer pricing. 
Although this was rejected by developing 
countries participating in the BEPS project, 
a group of OECD countries have pledged to 
implement such a scheme. Some of these 
countries have already signed tax treaties 
with developing countries which include 
arbitration provisions, and it seems that 
they are requesting such provisions in new 
treaties. A study by Sol Picciotto is examining 
the history and character of international tax 
dispute resolution, and analysing options for its 
improvement.
A key issue of concern to developing countries 
excluded from the BEPS project is natural 
resource taxation. Much work has been done in 
this area by many researchers, but a relatively 
neglected issue is the price-based royalty. This 
has the desirable attributes of an income or 
resource rent tax, but is easier to administer, 
since revenues are much less sensitive to 
transfer price manipulation and avoidance 
techniques. A study by Clausing and Durst using 
a dataset of the world’s largest extractive firms 
during the period 2003-2014 showed that there is 
a close relationship between product prices and 
firm profitability. This suggests that policy-makers 
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